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CONTVERTIBILITY OF' THE NAIRA:
ISSUES AND PROSPECTS'
Bg J. O. Ashirue

'ra
I

(Mrs.). Assisfant Dit'ecLor.

nn rapidly unfolding devel-

opments in the world

economy in recent times, have
led to resurgent calls for moves
towards currency convertibility
(basically, the unrestricted use of
a country's currency for internat-ional transactions. allowing it to
be freely exchanged for foreign
currencies) as a part of the process of integration into the world
market economy. The virtues of
convertibility appear to be widely
accepted: offering of greater
freedom of choice between foreign and domestic goods. services and assets: and when combined with trade liberalization.

could enhance

ef

through elimination

f

iciency

of

price

distortions.

In Nigeria, the issue of the
convertibility of the naira was
first raised by Ghana at the Accra
Ministerial meeting on ECOWAS
Protocols in July. 1976. At that
meeting. Ghana proposed the
adoption of the naira and the
CFA Franc as two convertible
currencies in the West African
sub-region. A major policy goal
of the 1995 Federal Government budget is "the deliberate
build-up and strengthening of
external reserves to enhance
confidence in the Nigerian
economy. strengthen the naira
and pave the way for its convertibility". Also the abolition of the
7962 Exchange Control Act by
the Federal Government early

this year is another step toward
the convertibility of the naira.
However. the inevitable costs
inherent in wrenching adjustment
entailed in moving toward currency convertibility have led to
divergent views on the desirable
pace toward convertibility. While
some are opting for gradualap-

proach. others prefer front
loaded approach. To understand

what is involved in the move to
convertibility and why some
countries opt for approaches that
are faster than others, it is needful to place the concept of convertibility in perspective.
This paper seeks to discuss
the issues and prospects of naira
convertibility. The paper is divided into four parts. Part 1 disclrsses the various concepts of
and preconditions for currency
convertibility. Part II, evaluates
Nigeria's economic conditions
in relation to the issue of convertibility. In Part III. implications of a convertible naira on
the national economy are examined. while summary and some
concluding remarks are contained in part IV.

Part I
Concepts and Pre-conditions
for Currency convertibility
Convertibility traditionally
defined as the unrestricted exchange of paper money into gold

lhc lrilernalional &:ononrtc Rclnlions Dcpl., CBN.
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at a predetermined rate. has long

played a central role in international economic relations. Until

1914, the United Kingdom
maintained full convertibility of
sterling into gold at a fixed rate.
Butin 1925.andagain. in7947 .
it failed in its attempts to restore
convertibility. not only to gold
but also to the U.S. dollar. because of high underlying rate of
inflation and inappropriate supporting macroeconomic policies
in the United Kingdorn. It was
only in 1958 that the Western
European nations re-established
currency convertibility (followi ng
the breakdown of the world financial system between the two
world wars and the move from a
gold standard to a modified gold/
dollar standard) although the financialdiscipline imposed by the
convertibility requirements at preestablished par values eventually
proved unacceptable to certain

major industrial countries. In
1973. the par value system.
which had been adopted with
the founding of the International
Monetary Furnd (lMF)at Bretton
Woods in 1944, collapsed, and
the era of floating rates was ushered in. In theory. this should
have allowed most countries to
move toward full convertibility.
since there would be no need to
impose restrictions to support a
particular exchange rate.
In practice. a large number
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of governments were unwilling
to give total freedom to their

I

currencies' movements preferring fixed exchange rates or at
least bands for the exchange
value of their currencies. Many
resorted to restrictions on trade
and payments (e.9.) exchange
control. tariff. etc.) rather than
monetary and fiscaldiscipline to
support their exchange rate
policies, correspondingly reducing the degr ee of convertibility of
their currencies. As a result. even
where tight governmeht controls
on currency convertibility existed.
there was usually a parallel. and
often iltegal market where currency could be exchanged at
some price.
Currency convertibility, in
principle. applies to the ability of
residents and nonresidents to
exchange domestic currency for
foreign currency without limit.
There are, however. many degrees of convertibility. with each
denoting the extent to which
governments impose limitations
on the use of currency. which
can take the form of prohibitions. taxes. special deposits
nominal ceilings (such as for travel
allowance), or procedures for allocating foreign exchange. But
even in cases where crrrrencies
are fully convertible, the practical scope depends not only on
the extent of government limitations on foreign exchange and
payments but also on restrictions
applied to the underlying transactions. such as imports, ser-

vices, or investing abroad. To
2

free one without the other is to
effectively limit the use of a given
currency in a practical sense, by
reducing the extent to which it
can be used to carry out transactions and make purchases.
Distinctions could as be made
between 'soft' and 'hard' concepts of convertibility. Soft convertibility entails the ability to
freely exchange currencies at
market- determined exchange
rates while hard convertibility
entails the right to freely exchange currencies at a given
exchange rates. Definitionally,
soft convertibility applies to flexible exchan ge rateregimes, while
hard convertibility is for fixed
exchange rate regimes. The key
distinguishing factor here is. who
bears the exchange rate risk?
Under the soft convertibility. the
holders of the currency do, while
under hard convertibility the
country issuing the currency
does. Soft convertibility is most
prevalent among nations today.
Countries participating in the
European Monetary System
(EMS), however. maintained hard
convertibility until August 1993.
At that time they temporarily
widened their bands of permissible exchange rate fluctuation
and thereby softened, at least in
principle. the requirement of
convertibility of their currencies.
The International Monetary

Fund (lMF). one of whose
founding purposes was to seek a
multilateral. nondiscriminatory
system of paymentsand transfers
for current international trans-

actions, and to eliminate foreign
exchange restrictions. accommodated the switch to floating
exchange rates by incorporating
them into the second Amendment of its Article of Agreement
in 1.978. This flexibility implied

that there would no longer be
any impediments. in principle.
to the adoption of full convertibility of members' currencies.
The fundamental notion of
convertibility enunciated by the
IMFisthat countries should allow
an unrestricted and nondiscriminatory right to residents to use
domestic cgrrency to e{fect
payments add transfers for current international transactions.
But it should be noted that the
Fund's concept of convertibility
as defined in its Articles of
Agreement (Article VIID. is a limited one, relating pragmatically
to the economic circumstances
of members. 2 Fund members are
obliged to maintain financial
convertibility (the absence of
government limitations on the
making of payments and transfers), but not capital account
convertibility. Moreover. the
Fund's concept applies only to
current account transactions (in
a few instances transactions of a
capitalnature are included, such
as amortization of loans or depreciation of direct investments)
and is limited mostly to relations
with other fund members. Deviation from the Fund's convertibility objectives are permitted,
although members are expected
to remove restrictions as soon as

Article VIII Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the IMF Articles ol Agreement, members accepting the obligation of the Article
undertake to refrain t'rom imposing restrictions on the making of payments ond translers t'or current
international transactions or lrom engaging in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency
practices witltout IMF approual.

22
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circumstances permit

The front-loaded approach
involves the overnight elimina-

Transition to Convertibility:
Historical Overview
Movement by the IMF member countries from inconvertibility to convertibility by accepting
obligations under Article VIII was
rather slow. By 1946,IMF's first
year of operation, only four out
of 44 member countries had
accepted Article Vlll obligations.
The bulk of the industrial countries did not do so untilthe early
1960s, and subsequent years saw
member countries doing so at a
rate of about three in a year. In
1993, the rate increased considerably, with member countries

tion of any exchange restrictions
on current account transactions.
It entails immediate establishment of external payments balance and a conceded policy push
in all economic and financial
areas. On the other hand. in the
pre-announcement approach, a
specific date is set for the elimination of all exchange restrictions and adoption of policies
that will achieve current account
convertibility. A country pursuing the by-product approach
would subordinate the achievement of convertibility to other
economic and financial policy

including Ghana, Tunisia,

objectives.

Morroco and the Gambia accepting Article VIII obligations,
which brought the cumulative
total to 86 countries3. IMF
rnembers accepting the obliga-

As noted earlier full convertibility embraces both current and
capital accounts convertibility.

However. most countries are
reluctant to pursue capital ac-

tions of Article VIII undertake to count convertibility owing to the
refrain from imposing restric- fear of unfavourable capita
tions on the making of payments movements The interferences
and transfers for current account with international capita flows
transactions or from engaging in have taken a variety of forms,
discriminatory currency ar- including both exchange restricrangements or multiple currency tions and specific quantitative
practices without IMF approval. limitations placed on capital
However, in the late 1960s and movements. These measures
1970s, the major industrialized have been justified on four princountries went beyond the re- cipal grounds:
quirements of Article VIII and (a) to limit balance of payments
instability;
moved, for the most part, to
(b)
to retain domestic savings
establish full convertibility oftheir
and prevent excessive forcurrencies.
eign ownership of domestic
The three basic approached
factors of production;
to convertibility are:
The front-loaded approach; (c) to minimize the return from
taxation of domestic capital
The Pre-announcement approach; and
and financial transactions;
and
The by - product approach.
IMF Suruey April 18, 1994 p. 117
23
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(d) to reinforce domestic stabilization and reform efforts.
Although, the above reasons
may still find some level of relevance today, it is pertinent to
note that externalpayments imbalances have roots in sources
other than capital movements
Thus, the imposition of capital
restrictions cannot be expected
to replace appropriate actions
to remove the basic source(s) of
imbalance.

Preconditions To Convert-

ibility
Experiences of many countries have shown that the mutual
goals of relative exchange rate
stability and convertibility cannot
be achieved simultaneously in an

inflationary environment or
where inflation is repressed by
price controls and rationing.
More concisely, if a country's
price level rises faster than its
trading partners (and abstracting
from terms of trade, institutional,

technological, and climatic
changes) it can not hope to
maintain equilibrium in its balance of payments without either

introducing ad hoc restrictions
on imports or payments or letting its currency depreciate; in
other words, without abandoning either convertibility or the
nominal stability of its currency.
Clearly, within this trade-off.
convertibility, accompanied by
increasing trade liberalization,
has been the more desirable objective.
According to Gilman (1990),
in moving toward convertibility,
a country would need to estab-
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lish certain pre-conditions if extreme fluctuations in its nominal
exchange rates are to be avoided.
These include:

(l)Realistic Exchange Rate
Whatever type of exchange
arrangement is put in place, the
realexchange rate must be compatible with a sustainable balance of payments over the medium term - that is relative price
must be roughly aligned. This
will usually entail movement from
an overvalued official exchange
rate and a substantially more
depreciated parallel market rate
toward a unified, market-clearing
nominal rate. This could involve ,
at least initially, floating the rate
in an auction market through
wltrich an increasing proportion
of external transactions (including those of the official sector)
are channelled. The goaL would
be to narrow, and then eliminate
any difference with the parallel
nrarket rate. Thus, maintenance
of a realistic exchange rate (one
tthat is perceived as being crediible in terms of market expectations), is a prerequisite for the
CIonvertibility of a currency.

there must be confidencd in the

system.

(3)Elimination of Price Con- value of the currency and politi-

trol
In countries where resource
allocation has been distorted
through the use of price controls,
the use of amarket<learing price
for foreign exchange has facilitated the determination of appropriate domestic market prices
in the non-tradable sectors. The
longer the domestic price structure has been distorted, the
greatizr the transitional costs of

adjustment; conversely, the
greater the benefits in the removal of distortions in the longrun.

(4)Adequate Foreign Ex-

cal stability of the issuing country. Second, a country should
possess broad financial markets

that are substantially free of
controls, (i.e. the existence of
well-developed secondary markets). It should also possess financial institutions that are sophisticated and competitive in
off-shore financial banking ac- .,
tivities.
On the first factor, high and
variable inflation rates - relative
to those of other countries generate nominal exchange rate
depreciation and uncertainty.
This increases the costs of ob-

taining and verifying acc.urate
Substantial foreign exc hange information about the prices of
reserves or external credit lines tradable goods and capital asmay be necessary to bolster sets. In addition, inflation inmarket credibility in an initial creases the costs of holding a
change B^eserves

period of adjustment, if convertibility is to be introduced while
maintaining a particular nominal exchange rate, or within a

currency by eroding its purchasing power, thereby debasing the
currency as an internationalstore
of value and medium of ex-

specified range. Balance of change. However, holding

a

payment support may also be relatively high inflation currency
needed in subsequent periods of in an interest yielding form can
external pressure. However, for offset some of the inflation costs
(2)Appropriate Macro-eco- members of the IMF. the use of but are associated with higher
the Fund resources could be risk.
nomic Policies
Appropriate macroeconomic temporarily made available for
The achievement of relatively
policies (essentially monetary and this purpose.
low levels of inflation variability
policies
fiscal
that would help
The removal or reduction of depends importantly on stable
restrain overall demand in line the abov,e obstacles should per- and consistent government
with a country's productive and mit a country to move toward policies. In this connection. a
debt-servicing capacities) must currency convertibility by elimi- track record of sustained current
be put in place. Internalfinancial nating varicud restrictions on account deficits ih excess of
stability, in the form of relatively payments and transfers - includ- normal private capital inflows
low inflation is essential to the ing the use of bilateralpayments (i.e. those capital inflows that
success of convertibility. A ma- agreements, import deposits. exist in the absence of incentives
jor burden will fall on monetary and export subsidies.
to incoming or outgoing capital)
policies, especially where there
Furthermore, two set of fac- can lead to continuous exchange
has been suppressed inflation tors are essentiai if a currency is rate depreciation and erosion of
and thus excess liqr,ridity in the to be used internationally. First, confidence in the currencv.
24
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There is need for well-developed and free financialmarkets.
Just as relatively low levels of
inflation and inflation variability
contribute to the demand for
international currencies. so also
well-developed financial markets
facilitate the supply as well as the
demand of such currencies. Thus,
the large and free financial
markets of the New York and
London contribute to the use of
the dollar and the pound sterling,

respectively. as international
currencies..

The absence of financial

market controls contributes to
lower costs of transacting in currency than would otherwise be

the case. Correspondingly.

a

country that possesses fairly large
financialmarkets is in a position

to

serve as an international

banking centre. Specifically, such

a country can be expected to
provide a high degree of efficiency in international liquidity
transaction by accepting shortterm liquid liabilities denominated
in its own currency, while making long-term, less liquid loans
abroad.
While the foregoing condition are important determinants

of international currency use,
they do not fully explain why a
currency emerges as a dominant
international currency. In this
regard, str-rdies of invoicing practices bbtween exporters and
importers have shown that the
internatio-nal dominance of a
nation's currency appears to be
directly related to the country's
share of world exports. the proportion of specialized manufactured products in itsexports. and
the extent of its trade with other

expected to eliminate wastages,
enhance investment and ultimately improve the trade balance. preserve the value of the

countries.

Part II
Evaluation of Nigeria's Economic Conditions in Relation
to the Issue of Convertibility domestic currency. maintain a
The pertinent question that comfortable external reserve
position and engender price
should naturally flow from the
for ultimate convertibilstability
above discussion is - does Nigeria possess the necessary pre- ity of the naira. The naira exconditions

to make the Naira

convertible? In this segment we
shall attempt to relate the issue
of pre-conditions with the Nigerian situation. As earlier stated,
the pre-conditions include: an
appropriate exchange rate regime - one consistent with bal-

ance in external payments: a
stock of international reserves
sufficient to cushion the effects
of economic shocks and seasonal fluctuations in net exchange

receipts; sound macroeconomic
management. including both fiscal and monetary management:
and an effective market environment- one in which market

forces are allowed

to play a

greater role. We now take these
issues one by one.

change rate has since then moved

from its initial over-valuation to
under-valuation in recent times
(according to the views of some
analysts). The adoption of floating exchange rate system has
also faci litated

prompt settlement

of import bills.
Prior to the first biding in the
Second Tier Foreign Exchange
market, in 1986. the exchange
rate of the naira vis-a-vis the
U.S. dollar was below one i.e.
less than one naira exchanged
for one US dollar between 1960
and 1985 offlcially. In the wake
of the Structural Adjustment
Program. in 1986. the naira depreciatedto N1 .73: $t.OO. On
the average, the naira depreciated from N4.02 : $1.00 in

tgBT to N22.41 = $1.00 in
Appropriate Exchange Rate 199 4,in'the official market. while
Policy
the parallel market rates ranged
Since the exchange rate is a
very important price mechanism
that directs the movement of
other prices in the domestic
economy and tries to equilibrate
the balance of payments it is not
surprising that the exchange rate
policy adopted by the authorities
since 1986 within the framework
o f SFEM/FEM AFEM/AFEN has
been geared towards achieving
medium to long term objectives
of a realistic exchange rate for
the naira for efficient allocation
of resources in the economy. It is

from N6.05 : $1.00 in 1987 to
N61.27 : $ t.OO in 1994.Thus.
the gap between these two rates
widened significantly from N2.03

\n 1987 to N40.86 in 7994.
With the adoption of Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market
(AFEM) in 1995 and deliberate
intervention by the Centra Bank
in the market. the exchange rate
of the naira has remained relatively stable. So far. the Central
Bank of Nigeria has met all the
foreign exchange demands of
banks by supplying a cumulative

25
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nanced mainly by the banking
various interventions. Since system since 1990, in the main,
February, 1995, the exchange accounted for the misalignments.
rates averaged N80.66 to the Between 1990 and 1994, the
dollar, in the AFEM between deficit,/GDP ratio moved from
February and September ,1995. 8.5 percent in 1990 to 1 1.0 and
In the bureaux de change and 10.2 percent in 199 1, and t992
the parallel markets the naira on respectively, and thereafter rose
the average also exchanged at to 15.4 per cent in 1993 but
N82.58 and N83.50 to the declined to 7 .4 per centin 1.99 4.
dollar, - a development which is The deficit financing through the
showingthe convergence of rates Centra Bank crowded out the
in these segments of the ex- private sector and resulted in
change market. The gap between injection of high powered money
the Cehtral Bank intervention into the economywhich'*ras not
rate and the parallelmarket rate matched by increases in domestic
has also narrowed from N26.51 output. Thus, a situation of exin April, 1994to N2.84 in 1995 cess liquidity coupled with excess
on the average. Although it is demand resulted in the persistent
too early to conclude on the upward rnovement in the prices
appropriateness of the current of goods and services.
In the money market, nomimodality and the emerging rates,
one may not be too far from the nal interest rates also maintained
fact that the current AFEM rate upward movement in the deapproximates closely to the re- regulated financial sector in
alistic rate of the naira given that parallelwith the accelerating inthe gap between the AFEM/ flation rate, while real interest
Parallel rates has remained nar- rates declined - even to negative
row overtime. In this connection , in 1992. Since 1994 interest
applying the simple economic rates has been fixed. This policy
principles of demandand supply, reversal created distortion as
one may accede to the fact that savers and owners of financial
the foreign exchange demand wealth moved their funds away
and supply in recent months has from the banking system to inalso matched each other, in vestments that provide some
contrast to the situation prior to protection from inflation, such
this arrangement.
as real estate, commodities or
foreign currency transactions.
Appropriate Macroeco nomic
The excess liquidity in the
Policies
system also aggravated the ingrowing
has
There
been
crease in demand for foreign
macroeconomic instability since exchange which manifested in
the mid-1970s but the years- persistent pressure on the naira
t990 - 1994 witnessed a exchange rate and balance of
worsening situation in most payments position. Thus, the
economic indicators. The exces- period 7987 - 1994 was characsive expansionary fiscal policies terized by inconsistencies in
of the Federal Government fi- macroeconomic policy mix as

total of $1,040.7 million at its

26

policy outcomes deviated markedly from the targets due to frequent. abrupt and unnecessary
changes in policy goals and instruments. For now. one cannot
say that the macroeconomic
policy mix (monetary and fiscal)
Ior ),995 is appropriate of not,
but there exists some level of
contradictions between the two
policies. However. the current
tight fiscalstance of government
is a step in the right direction.
although. the same cannot be
said about the monetary policy
in a regime of fixed interest rate.

3. Elimination of Price
Control
The distortion in the domestic prices in the economy caused
by government subsidies on various sectors is gradually giving
way to appropriate prices. With

the abolition of commodity
boards, and withdrawal of subsidies on petroleum products
utilities, ports facilities, air-

transportation, etc. there has
been a slow, but steady movement towards appropriate pricing in the economy. It is worthy
to note also that the 1995 Budget
has in a significant way put in
place some structural changes

that will lead to the ultimate
convertibility of the naira. Such
changes are: the repealing of the
Exchange ControlAct of 7962:
introduction of AFEM, and
Domiciliary accounts; the repeal
of the Enterprises Promotion
Decree of 1979; the planned
contract leasing of some key
public-sector owned industries:
and the planned establishment
of a private-sector driven commodity exchange markets"

July/September 1995
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laden with large stock of external

cannot be divorced from eco-

debt and debt service burden,
the external reserves,/imports
ratio is not a reliable method of
measuring the adequacy of externalreserves. The crucial point
the West, whose currencies are to note here is that irrespective
fully convertible still have one of the reserve levels, what really
form of subsidy or the other.
matters is the volume of inflow

nomics. The design of economic
policy must take into account
appropriate socio-political dimensions for its effectiveness
More so, the implementation of
policy is generally under the
control of the appointed authorities. More often in the Nigerian case, we have had frequent
changes in ministerial composition both at Federal and State
levels and by extension significant
policy changes as new leadership
changes baton. Similarly, politicalinstability is not conducive for
foreign investment inflow as no
genuine investor willinvest in an
area of high uncertainty.
With respect to well-developed and free financialmarkets,
Nigerian financial markets have
undergone several deregulations
since the adoption of SAP in
1,986 and consequently, cannot
by any standard be said to be
undeveloped. At present, there
ar e I 16 licensed commercial and
merchant banks in Nigeria. Of
these, 65 are commercialbanks

However, there still exists
some level of subsidies in the
areas of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs, but this is expected as even the most advanced industrial economies of

and outf low. The synchronization

Adequate Foreign Exchange of these two variables in the
Resenres
context of edsting realties is more
One of the methods fre- important in considering conquently used in measuring the vertibility than the level of existadequacy of reserves is the re- ing reserves.
serveslmports ratio (an IMF
Confidence in the value of
minimum reserves requirement).
This refers to adequate reserves
which can finance 4 months
imports. Nigeria has over the
years used this method to measure its reserves adequacy.
However, there is no consensus
on acceptable scientific way of
measuring adequate reserves in
a country. Consequently, the
method adopted by any country
at any point in time is a matter of
convenience and to that extent
is merely a guide. Theresewes/
imports ratio of Nigeria from
1980 to 1993 is shown in Table
II. The ratio declined from 7 .Zin
1980 to 1.1 in 1983, rose
gradually to 7.2 in 1986 and
thereatter declined to 1.8 in
1988. The ratio nudged to 5.7
and 9.7, in 1989 and 1990,
respectively. In 199 1, 1992, and
L993, respective ratios of 6.9,
1.2 and 2.4 were recorded.
Nevertheless, the use of the
above analysis alone to determine
the level of reserves adequacy
can be misleading as severalother
factors at various points in time
influence the ration. The present
situation in which the country is
27

the naira and politicalstability is
another issue of importance
which can not be quantified.
Confidence in any country's
currency is a direct bye-product
of that country's productive
strength. It is directly dependent
on the level of economic activities as well as the level of goods
and services that is demanded by
international communities. The
strength of any economy also
will be retlected not just on the
varieties in the range of tradable
but also on the size of the
economy. While Nigeria's
tradable in international markets
are presently dominated by crude
petroleum, there is a very high
potentialfor the enlargement of
this frontier as many other relevant internationally tradable

while 51 are merchant bank.
While the commercial banks
operate a branch net work of
about 2,547.,the merchant banks

have about 144 branches. At
the current level, the average
number of persons per bank
branch is23,599. Although, the
abound and are at various stages incidence of financial distress is
of exploitation. Hence, recent significant among virtually all
creation of a Federal Ministry for categories of financial institusolid mineral development is very tions, this fact had not halted
growth in the number of primary
much welcomed.
The issue of political stabil- mortgage institutions, commuity, however, remains a big hurdle
for the country. In fairness,
Nigeria's political terrain has
been very unstable and politics

nity banks and bureaux

de
change. The number of Primary
Mortgage institutions currently
stand at 229,Community Banks

July September 1995

Volume 19 No.3

I

970, while that of bureaux de billion or 37.0 per cent during

facilitates the international

the period. Broad Primary Production which inch-rde Agriculture. Crude Petroleum and
Mining and Quarrying constituted over 51.5 per cent of total
GDP in 1994.

transfer of technology. Current
account converlibility encourages
a country to produce the goods
and services in which it has
comparative advantage and
generally promotes an improved
structure of economic incentives
A step further to capitalaccount
convertibility can offer member
countries significant additional
benefits. It can at':act foreign
investment. this in turn. can accelerate the introduction of improved technologies and more
efficient production methods. In

change is 183. However, for the
first time in several decades. the
Central Bank of Nigeria closed
some banks and non-bank institutions which were terminally
distressed in 1994 as part of the
efforts aimed at strengthening
the financial system as a whole.
The recent introduction of the
secondary securities market and
their relative performance in
recent times reinforce the relative development of the financial
system in Nigeria.

Structure of Nigeria's Production and Exports
As indicated earlier. the
proportion of specialized manufactured products in a country
export is a sine qua non to the
emergence of a currency as international currency. Nigeria's
share of world exports and the
proportion of specialized manufactured products in its exports.
and the capacity to expand its
primary export commodities in
the world markets in response to
price changes are limited. Nigeria by allstandard is stilla primary
producer. The manufacturing
sector is small in both absolute
terms and in terms of its contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Table V shows the
GDP at 1984 factor cost indicating the share of activity sector
in totalGDP {rom 1989 - L9L)4.

Manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP has generally been
belo',v N9 billion or 9.0 percent
of totalGDP. Orr the other hand.
Agriculture. including livestock.
Forestry and Fishery has con-

tributed

to GDP around

N35

Given the structure of

Nigeria's production and foreign
trade. exchange rate policy was
expected to result in the diversification of the export base by
boosting non-oil exports and
controlling the grorvth of imports.
The exchange rate action does
not have much impact on oil
earnings as the price and quantity of crude oil produced are
fixed in international market. The
same also goes for the primary
export commodities. the prices
of which are set by international
commodity markets.

Part III
Implications of a convertible naira on the economy
Article 1 of the IMF's Article
of Agreement makes clear the
systemic benefits that flow from
widespread currency convertibility. including promotion of
world trade efficient resource
allocation. economic growth. and
ernployment.
From the individual member
country's point of view. rnoving
to current account convertibility
offers many advantages. It reduces distortions associated r,vith

{oreign exchange rationing.
contributes to increased productivity by opening the domestic
market to increased competition.

improves access to imported
inputs and capital goods. and

addition. f oreign investors'
knowledge of n-rarket opportr
nities abroad may encourage the
growth of the country's exports.
On the other hand. transition
to current account convertibility

may have some temporary
negative impacts on the country
concern. The resulting expansion
of {oreign con-ipetition for domestic industries may. for example. force the restructuring of
their prodr-rction and lead to
temporary declines in output.
Another prominent cost involved in currency convertibility
is the redurction of policy optior-rs
available to government to deal
with serious adverse balance of
payments development. The
government can no longer impose direct controls such as exchainge control or import licensing. nor directly manipulate

the exchange rarte. It

cor-rld.

however still intervene indtrectly
bv takincl ntonetary and fiscal
policy nteasrrres which are generarllv slow in h.rving the desired
im1:racl.
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Part IV
and Ugandawhich have adopted Project RAT /77 /032: UNCTRecommendation and some the said Article do not have a ADIECDCTf A/I8 G. E. 85concluding remarks
stronger economic or productive 55375
base than Nigeria. For instance,

The analysisthus far indicates
clearly that making the Naira a
convertible currency is not only
desirable, but is as consistent
with the current policy stance of
the government. It is also clear
that Nigeria has to some extent
met the basic preconditions for
the adoption of the IMF Article
VII which also implies current
account convertibility. However
the analysis also does indicate
that formidable problems loom
large on the path of internationalization of the currency.
These include relative underdevelopment of the economy.
structure of the economy which
lacks diversified export base, inadequate external resources,
persistent balance of payments
problem, high inflation rate, etc.
Never-the-less, on the strength
of our restructuring exercise, it is
clear that some countries like
Ghanaandthe Gambia and most
recently some East Africa countries namely, Tanzania, Kenya

29

in these countries single com- Frimpong - Ansah. J. E. et al;
modity dominated their export
basket and agriculture is the
mainstay of their economy.
However, considering the fact
that the current level of attainment in some of the pre-conditions enumerated above were
achieved barely six months ago.
It is our considered opinion that
if this level of achievement is
maintained through policy consistency. Nigeria could be ready
for current account convertibility in the next few years. However regarding capital account
convertibility, Nigeria is not ready
for the consequences that might
follow. In any case, capital account convertibility is the exception rather than the rule.
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Table

I

Nigeria's oil and non-oil exports (1985-1994)
=N= Million

oit
Year

Non-Oil
Export

Export

1985
985

11.223.7

1.987

28,208.6

1988
1989
1990

28.435.4
55,016.8

497

8.368.5

1

Oil Export as

Total
Export

.l

7o

95.8
93.8
92.9
91.2
94.9
97.0
96.2
97.9
97.7
97.4

11,720.8
8.920.6
30,360.6
31.192.8
57,971.2
109,886.1

552.7
2,152.0
2,757.4
2.954.4
3.259.6

1

106,626.5
116,856.5

1992

201,383.9

1993

2t3.778.8

t994

200.936.1

Source

Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report (Various issues)

199

r2r,533.7

4,677.2
4,227.8

205.6t1.7

5,022.3
5,349.0

218,801. 1
206.285.1

Level of Extirnal

*."lio"';*rorts

(198o

of total

4.2

o.z

7.t
t].d
5.1

3.0
J.d

27
o)

2.6

- tss4l.

=N=
Year

Total Extemal

ended

Reserves

:N=

Million

1880

5.445.6

198

2,424.8
1.026.5

1

1982
1983

r984

7

8r.7

1.143.8

1985

l,64l.t

t986
t987

4.643.3

1988
1989
1990

3.587.4

Average Monthly
Imports
=N= Million

758.0
1.060.0
897.5
7 42.0
598.2
588.6
498.6
1.488.5
1.787.1
2,571.7
809.8

Equivalent

1.2
o)
L .,)
1.1
1.1

i.9
2.8
7.2
3.1
1.8

1991

1992

i4.013.1

tI.929

.:)

1.1

t993
t994

29.112.7

13.808.0
13.418.9

2.2
9'7

.lo.JU / .d

.457 .4

Source' Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report (Various

30

No. of Months

3.272.7
13.457.1
34.970.0
44.269.6

7

Issues)

Non-Oil Export
as ([r of total

5.2

o.J
6.5
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TABLE III
FOREIGN EXCHANGE SUPPLY AND DEMAND

1990 - 1994
Amount Offered

Actural Demand by

(us $M)

&nks

7990

2,646.1

20,t96.6

2,501.6

1991

3,158.4

9.452.3

2,927.3

1992

5,090.4

6,434.6

4,045.7

1993

3,103.9

40.64t.9

2,892.7

1994

1,880.0

35,691.3

1,961.1

Year

Amount Release

Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report (various issues)

Source

TABLE IV
NIGERIA'S PRINCIPAL DEBT AND DEBT SERVICE RATIO (1980-1994)
(=N= MILLION)

3l

Year

External
Debt

1980

1.866.8

13.3

3.8

0.7

1981

2,33r.2

22.3

4.5

5.0

1982

8.819.4

101.1

t6.9

8.9

1983

10,577.7

141.0

17.4

17.6

1984

t4,577.7

160.0

21.2

29.1

1985

1/

,290.6

t54.2

51.0

33.1

1986

41,451.9

486.9

95.5

t987

105,395.5

370.3

86.9

29.4
)') o

1988

t46,07 6.1

242.1

114.3

29.4

1989

242.e33.7

275.0

101.2

11.9

1990

297,894.3

231.9

98.9

24.2

1.991.

328.054.3

273.3

79.0

25.8

1992

544,264.t

292.1

72.3

26.8

1993

633,r44.4

273.3

79.0

16.9

1994

648,813.0

292.r

72.3

t8.7

Source

Central Bank ol Nigeria, Annual Reports

Debt,/Export Debt,ZGDP

Debt Serv,€xport

o,

o
c
3
o

N

(o

z
9

CD

Table V
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT 1984 FACTOR COST
(N billion)

Amual Percentage Change

Percentage Share in Total

(Growth Rate)

Activity Sector

1990
(1)

1. Agriculhrre
27.21
2 Livestock
5.17
3. Forestry
1.20
4. Fishing
1.70
5. Crude Petroleum
I 1.65
6. Mining & Quarrying
0.27
7. Manufacturin1
7.36
8. Utilities
0.50
9. Building & Construction
1.73
10. Tmnsport
2.a5
11. Communiation
0.26
12. Wholesale & Retail Trade
1 .49
13. Hotel & Restaurant
0.48
14. Fmance & lnsurance
7.88
15. Ral Estate
0.26
16. Housing
2.08
17. Producers of C,ovemment SeMces 7.60
18. Comm. Soc. & Pers. Seruices 0.67
1

TOTAL (G.D.P.)
NON,OTL (G.D P

)

1991

(21

19921

1

993r

7994:

1

1991 1992
(7t
(8)

990

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

28.43

29.28

30.13

31.04

30.1

s.09

5.i4

5.17

5.22

1.23

1.26

1.29

7.32

1.77

1.59

1.19

12.72

13.06

o.27

0.28

8.05

1993
(e)

1994

7997

r992

1993

1.994

(10)

(1 1)

(12).

(13)

(14)

30 05

30.06

30.23

30.74

4.48

2.99

2.90

3.02

6.57

6.22

6.09

5.95

5.86

(1.ss)

0.98

0.58

o.97

1.33

1.30

1.29

r.29

2.50

2.44

234

2.33

7.72

1.88

1.87

1.63

I .19

1

4.12

(10.17)

(2s.16)

(5.88)

12.72

I 1.96

1.2.89

73.M

13.41

12.76

I 1.84

9.18

2.67

12.60],

15.e7)

0.30

0.31

0.30

0.29

o.29

0.30

0.31

0.00

3.70

7.74

3.33

7.66

7.34

6.97

8.15

8.51

7.86

7.37

6.90

9.38

(4.84)

(4.18)

(5.04)

0.51

0.56

0.58

0.61

0.55

0.54

o.57

0.68

0.60

2.00

9.80

3.57

5.t7

1.80

1.87

1.96

2.O2

1.91

1.90

1.92

r.97

2.00

4.05

3.89

4.81

3.06

2.95

3.08

3.22

3.24

3.15

3.72

J.Ib

3.23

3.21

3.51

4.47

4.55

o.62

0.24

o.27

o.28

o.2a

o.29

o.25

o.2a

0.28

o.28

(7.69].

12.50

0.00

I 1.86

12.22

12.59

12.59

12.72

12.54

72.54

12.63

t2.47

3.22

3.04

3.70
3.03

0.48

0.49

0.50

0.50

0.51

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.00

2.04

2.04

0.00

8.75

8.88

9.02

4.06

3.90

3.87

2.94

1

1.i

0.00

8.20

8.52

8.85

9.11

8.72

8.67

0.26

o.27

0.28
2.34

o.29

0.29

0.27

o.28

o.28

o.29

0.00

3.85

3.70

3.57

2.41

2.30

2.28

2.31

2.35

2.39

3.85

4.).7

4.00

2.99

1.12

8.41

8.36

10.15

1.01

4.08

12.52

13.71

9.88

0.87

0.74

0.72

9.74
o.74

0.86

)..49

5.88

11.11

8.75

2.16

7.9t

8.90

10.12

0.68

o.72

0.80

1

0.80

1

90.36 94.61 97.42 99.66 100.98 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 4.70
78.71 81.89 84.36 86.94 89.02 87.11 86.56 a6.59 87.24 88.16 4.04

2.97 2.30
3.O2 3.06

1.32

2.39

rRevivd.
2FOS Fstimates.

Sources:

(i)

(ii)

Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos.
National Planning Commission.

(c

U)

o
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o
3
o
o
(o
(o
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